

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

411030

Document No. 001

NO CHANGE in Class. ☐ 3 June 1949

☒ DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 183 Auth: DDA REG. 77-1133

Date: 9/1/77

SUBJECT: The "UN World" and its article on the "Gromyko Plan." 023

Summary:

With no tangible evidence to support the thesis of the "UN World" article, neither its authorship nor known international political developments lend credibility to the report of such a basic change in the Soviet attitude toward the West.

A. The Periodical and Its Staff.

The "United Nations World," formerly "Free World," is an erratic and poorly directed publication where tendentious and inaccurate material is found side by side with some straightforward contributions. The driving force behind the publication is Louis Dolivet, the "International Editor." It is backed by Pearl S. Buck and her husband, Richard J. Walsh, by Beatrice Straight, Dolivet's wife, as well as a number of reputable figures in the business world. At the same time, some dubious names are found in the masthead such as Dolivet, Farago, and Fagrell (see below).

The article on the so-called Gromyko plan is simply signed by "The Editors," but is probably ascribable either to Dolivet or Ladislas Farago, "Senior Editor," neither of whom should be regarded as a reliable reporter of fact.

Dolivet, born Ludovic Brecher, is a naturalized Frenchman of Rumanian origin with a long record of Communist activity in Europe. He reportedly became a Comintern agent in 1933 and has used several aliases during his CP activities. He is married to Beatrice Straight, sister of Michael Straight of the "New Republic." Dolivet is reported as collaborating with Pierre Cot, ardent French fellow-traveller, and John Ennals, UK left-winger, in effecting Communist infiltration of the World Federation of United Nations Associations. Dolivet is suspected of participating in a broad and subtle propaganda enterprise for the benefit of the Kremlin under guise of objective reporting ostensibly designed to support the UN.

Note: This report has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUN 7 1949
88-8

Farago, a US citizen of Hungarian birth, was a wartime civilian employee of ONI working on "psychological warfare." He enjoys close connections with Admiral Ellis Zacharias (USN Ret). While not believed to be subversive, he is irresponsible, habitually in debt and given to sensationalism and journalistic sharp practice. After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a news interview with General Helge Jung, Commander in Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces, he reportedly pieced together an article composed of miscellaneous public statements by Jung and had it published January 1949 in the "UN World" as a signed contribution which the General promptly repudiated.

B. Evaluation of the Article "What Gromyko Told Stalin." UN World, June 1949. p. 4.

The article itself appears to be an estimate of Soviet policy made by the editors of "UN World" simply on the basis of events leading up to the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. These events apparently pointed to a Soviet effort to reach a temporary agreement with the West, intended to gain a Soviet voice in all Germany, open the way to increased East-West trade, and effect a relaxation of Western rearmament and consolidation. There has been no indication, however, that such a shift would be more than tactical in its nature. There is no tangible evidence that the occurrences related in the article ever took place. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the estimate was made on the basis of any "inside information," and the tone of the article reverses basic ideological tenets of the Soviet Union. The impression gained from the article is that the USSR contemplates a sincere effort to compose its differences with the West and create an atmosphere of international peace and harmony. Such a concept is diametrically opposed to Marxist ideological foundation of the Soviet state, currently in process of re-affirmation throughout Soviet society, which envisages continued basic hostility between the capitalist and Marxist worlds, ending eventually in the triumph of the latter.

The eight points reported as the "highlights of Gromyko's report to Stalin" imply that the Soviet leaders have in the past sincerely believed their own propaganda concerning the "warlike intentions" of the US. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union has had ample opportunity to observe, and has ignored, US efforts to achieve peace. The article reports, as one of the highlights, the statement that "the UN is the proper agency for composing US-USSR differences." This attitude has never been reflected in Soviet actions and, on the contrary, the Kremlin has consistently sought direct settlement of major issues outside the United Nations.

The article states that the principles of the "Gromyko plan" having been accepted by the Politburo, "Vishinsky and Gromyko were promoted to the top posts in the Foreign Offices and given unprecedented power and latitude for direct negotiations with Western representatives." To date, Vishinsky and Gromyko have demonstrated no "unprecedented powers," and the validity of this statement, viewed against the background of past Soviet behavior, appears highly questionable. The personnel shifts in the Soviet hierarchy are, in general, believed to have reflected an effort to relieve the policy leaders of the Soviet Union from routine responsibilities and it is not believed, in the case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that Molotov has relinquished policy control. The elevation of Vishinsky would seem to contradict the implication of a sincere Soviet effort to achieve peace with the West. Vishinsky's vitriolic harangues against the West establish him as no more conciliatory than Molotov. For such a basic shift as the article implies, it would have been more logical for the USSR to introduce another and less controversial figure, as for example, Litvinov.

The article also gives the wrong impression concerning the Malik-Jessup talks, implying that Dr. Jossup approached Malik with the "suggestion that the Berlin issue be reviewed." In fact, Dr. Jossup merely inquired as to the significance of the omission from Stalin's reply to Kingsbury Smith of any mention of currency. In reply, Malik initiated the talks on Berlin.

The article alleges that Gromyko "reappraised" a number of questions, including the Greek situation, the Marshall plan, US recognition of the Chinese Communists, atomic energy, and withdrawal from Germany. While these questions are probably under continual study by Soviet officials, there is no indication, with the possible exception of the problem of Greece, that the USSR has made any basic reappraisals. In the case of Greece, Gromyko reiterated to a State Department official the peace proposals previously made by the Greek rebels. The terms were unacceptable to the West and, at the present time, can be considered little more than a part of the Soviet propaganda campaign for "peace." Their only significance lies in the fact that they prepare the groundwork for a possible future move. It is significant to note that in this matter, Gromyko again attempted to engage the US bilaterally, outside the UN, in discussion of a problem of interest to other parties, notably Greece itself.

The article then deals with the possible dissolution of the Cominform, and creates the impression that such action would constitute a major Soviet step towards rapprochement with the West. Such an impression appears to be incorrect. Dissolution of the Cominform would have some impact on public opinion in the West, but as in the case of the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, there is no reason to believe that such action would be taken in good faith. In any event, it would appear that settlement of outstanding issues between East and West would constitute much more concrete evidence of Soviet intentions.

While Soviet intentions in the CFM remain obscure, to date there has been little indication of Soviet willingness to compromise or, to quote the article, "go to amazing lengths to accommodate Washington, London and Paris." Furthermore, it is estimated that the conduct of the USSR in the CFM substantiates the belief that Soviet concessions will be the absolute minimum necessary to achieve Soviet objectives. Soviet tactics in the CFM have to date represented a probing operation to determine the unity and strength of the Western position.